The Demographic Siege

From Dharmapedia Wiki
Jump to: navigation, search

The Demographic Siege is a book by Koenraad Elst.

  • Elst: " The Demographic Siege (Voice of India 1998): This booklet counters the soothing “secularist” propaganda by giving the true demographic figures and deducing from these an unmistakable procentual growth of the Muslim population in India. It concludes that in the mid-long term, the choice is between an Islamic take-over or a massive walk-out by born Muslims from Islam. "

Extracts[edit]

  • Swami Shraddhananda quotes from the 1911 Census Report (para 172 ff.) to show the reasons why the Muslim populat­ion is growing faster than the Hindu population, whose per­cent­age of the total population is steadily declinin­g. The Census Direc­tor had writ­ten: "The number of Muham­mada­ns has risen during the decade [1901-11] by 6.7 per cent as compared with only 5 p.c. in the case of Hindus. There is a small but continuous accession of converts from Hinduism and other religions, but the main reason for the relatively more rapid growth of the followers of the Prop­het is that they are more prolific."
  • One of Mukher­ji's conclud­ing sen­tences, "They count their gains, we calculate our losses", became the title of a Hindu Mahasabha pamphlet as late as 1979.
  • For those who dismiss U.N. Mukherjee's reasoning as an obvious and ridicu­lous case of paranoia, it may be useful to verify this prediction for the subsequent 80 years. Of­ficial census data show that the Hindu per­centage has decli­ned, and the Muslim percentage increas­ed, in every single successive census in British India, free India, Pakistan and Bangl­adesh.
  • In trun­cated India, the Muslim population has grown 2.69% in forty years (from 9.91% to 12.6% in 1951-91), but Muslim leaders like Imam Bukhari routine­ly claim that the true figure of the Muslim popul­ation in the Indian Repub­lic is about 3% high­er. There are indeed some probl­ems with the official figur­­es­­ for the Indi­an Republic, e.g. there is a suspic­ion that many illegal Bangladeshi immigrants are lying low and avoid­ing the census personnel because they are used to a regime which is not so leni­ent with un­sol­ici­ted im­migrants (Banglad­esh pushed back the Muslim Rohin­gya refug­ees from Myanmar in 1992-93). But for the present­ dis­cus­sion, it is probably best to keep these al­leged un­registered mil­lions outside our considerations and stick to verified figures. Even without this unknown "dark figure" of unregistered Muslim inhabitants, it is only very slightly exag­gerated to say that in the Indian Repub­lic, ever since 1951, "the propor­tion of Mus­lims has been gradually but steadily increa­sing every decade by roughly one percentage point"­.
  • All kinds of local and regional data confirm the faster muslim grow­th rate. The two provinces with the highest relative population growth bet­ween 1981 and 1991 are Kashmir (28%) and Lakshadweep (27%), both with a Muslim minority though in very divergent economic and political conditions; fol­lowed by Madhya Pradesh (26%) and Uttar Pradesh (25%). In Uttar Prade­sh, between 1981 and 1991, the Muslim percentage rose from 15.53% to 17.33 %, in Bihar from 14.13% to 14.81%, in West Bengal from 21.51 to 23.61%. While in Bihar birth control seemed to have a slight effect in a decrease of the decadal increase from 30.03% in 1971-81 to 29.5% (still more than 5% higher than the Hindu figure) in 1981-91, there was a much larger increase in the decadal increase in U.P. from 29.11% to 36.54%, and in West Bengal from 29.55% to 36.89%.
  • Ever since regular census operations were started, the per­centage of Muslims has grown every decade in British India, in­dependent India, Pakis­tan and Banglade­sh.
  • The Muslim percentage has not only incre­ased, but the rate of increase itself has increased.
  • This is very clear when we take a long-term perspective: in the fifty years between 1941 and 1991, their per­cent­age has risen 5.64% (from 24.28% to 29.92%), substan­tially more than the 4.31% gain in the sixty years bet­ween 1881 and 1941. At this rate, the Muslims in the Subcon­tinent must have passed the 30% mark in the mid-1990s and will pass the miles­tone of becoming more than half the num­ber of Hindus (ca. 32% to ca. 64%) before the census of 2011.
  • Simi­larly calculating from the available figures for the three coun­tr­ies, the Hindu per­centage had come down to 65.15% in 1991. To evaluate the trend of the Hindu percentage, we must take into account that the pre-Indepen­dence census always had a tentative category "trib­al" or "animist", variously defined and therefore making odd quantitative jumps (but always between 2.26% and 3.26%), from 2.57% in 1881 to 2.26% in 1941. After Indepen­dence, this category was included in the Hindu categ­ory. So, putting everything on the post-In­dependence deno­mi­nator, we include the "animists" in the Hindu percentage to get a total Hindu percentage of 77.35% for 1881, 71.72% for 1941, and 65.15% for 1991. Here again, we see a long-term ac­celerat­ion of the ob­served trend: a decrease of 5.63% in the sixty years between 1881 and 1941, and a larger decre­ase of 6.57% in the shorter period of fifty years bet­ween 1941 and 1991.
  • So, all the predictions quoted above are far too conservative, for they are based on a linear projection. In reality, the observed trends are accelerating, so Mus­lims will need far less than 316 years to out­number the Hindus. According to Muk­herji, the Hindu percentage of ex-British India (including India, Pakistan, Banglad­esh and Burma) should now have declined by about 13%, down to 54% of the total.
  • It gets even more dramatic when you look at it this way: in 1984, a generat­ion of Muslims which was about 12% of the population had produ­ced a generation of children, certainly not more than 30 years younger on average, which constitu­ted more than 16%. This would mean an unpreceden­ted growth rate of more than 4% in less than 30 years, or rather, a growth with over a third of the original per­centage (4 to 12). For a little thought experiment: if this differential growth rate is kept con­stant, we get 16.81% of Muslims in ca. 2014, over 22% in 2044, near­ly 30% in 2074, 40% in 2104, crossing 50% in ca. 2125 etc., all with­out coun­ting the effect of Muslim immigration.
  • The one general prediction to which the data cer­tainly compel us, is that the Muslim percentage will be increas­ing at an ac­celerating rate for at least another generation; and also beyond that, unless the present generation of young adult Muslims brings it procreati­on rate down to the average Indian level.
  • In Pakistan and Banglad­esh, the Mus­lim per­centage has con­tinually increased, partly by pester­ing the non-Muslims out, partly by conver­sions under pres­sure (pres­surizing people to marry their daugh­ters off to Muslims, allocating jobs on conditon of conver­sion, etc.), and partly by higher birth-rates. Bangladeshi Muslim expan­sion has al­ready destroyed the Chakmas and other non-Muslim popu­lat­ions in the Chitta­gong Hill Tracts, with the eth­nically cleansed minorities fleeing to India's North-East, there to create friction with the host popul­ation. But the most wor­rying from the Indian viewpoint is not the rise in percentage but the rise in absolute figures: in parts of Pakistan and in the whole of Ban­gla­desh, sheer living space is becoming extremely scarce, and these countries may pursue a policy of pushing their surplus population into India.
  • Incidentally, in Nepal the breakt­hro­ugh of Islam (nearly non-exis­tent in the 1970s) is simply spectacular, and is again due in large meas­ure to im­migrat­ion from Banglad­esh. In Sri Lanka, the Muslim per­centage is slowly rising by demograp­h­ics alone.
  • So, every decade the Muslim per­cent­age in the Subcon­tinent incre­ases by more than 1%, with the rate of incre­ase itself incr­eas­ing. In India, the rate of incre­ase in the Muslim per­centage is considerable, though lower than the subcontinental total, but is rising faster due to the differential in the use of birth control and the incre­asing Muslim immigration. In Hin­dutva circles, this remarkable demogr­aphic dif­feren­tial is interp­reted as the result of Muslim "demographic aggres­sion".
  • Hindu Revivalists are glad to quote unsuspect secular sources to confirm their worst misgivings about Muslim demographic aggres­sion from Bangladesh. A 1992 report prepared by B.B. Dutta for the North-Eastern Congr­ess Coordination Com­mittee meeting in Guwahati looked into both types of im­migration and notes: "Between 1971 and 1981, Bangladesh census records show a reduc­tion of 39 lakhs in the minority population. "Between 1981-89, 36 lakh religious minorities were missing from that coun­try. "In 1972, there were 7.5 lakh Bihari Muslims in the camps in Dacca. As a result of mediation by Saudi Arabia only 33,000 of them were accepted by Paki­stan. At pres­e­nt, there are less than two lakhs in the camps, where have the rest gone? (...)
  • Is there anything demonstrably intentional about this Islamic demo­gra­phic expansion? In an article seek­ing to "explode the myth" of Mus­lim demo­gra­phic aggres­sion, jour­nali­sts Namita Bhan­dare, Louise Fernan­des and Minu Jain them­selves admit that accor­ding to of­ficial surveys, "the disapproval of family planning is highest among Muslims", while "the practice of family planning methods in 1980 was lowest amongst Muslims (only 23% of those surveyed prac­tised it as op­posed to 36% Hin­d­us)". They furt­­­­­­­­­­h­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­er admit that between 1971 and 1981, "the Hindu po­pu­l­ation was up by 24.1­5%, whereas the Muslim popula­tion shot up by 30.59­%". Further, they give the decline in fer­tility levels in the same period: 20.1% decline for urban and 20.0% for rural Hindus, 18.5% for urban and 17.3% for rural Mus­lims. This means that the al­ready lower fertility level of the Hindus is declining faster than that of the Muslims.
  • Let us hear the same indications from an official source: "The total fertility rate (TFR) is 3.4 children per woman. (...) Muslims have con­siderably higher fer­tility than any other religious group. Muslim women have a TFR of 4.4, which is 1.1 children higher than the TFR for Hindu women."
  • The implication of these data is that the Muslim rate of growth in percentage of the Indian population will go on incre­asing. Instead of extrapolating across cen­turies, we may make a safer prognosis for the next few decades. It is safe to pred­ict that the 2001 census will show another sharp increase in the rate at which Muslims are demograph­ically catching up with the Hindu majority. It is then that the full effect of the birth control cam­paigns of the 1960s and 70s will become visible. Given the higher Hindu participation in the birth control effort of the 1960s and 70s, we must now be witnes­sing a cumulative effect, of a proportionately smaller number of Hindu moth­ers (born in that period) having in their turn each a smaller number of children than the propor­tiona­tely larger number of Muslim mothers, on average.
  • Baljit Rai, a retired police officer who was a personal witness to India's failure in con­tain­ing the rising tide of il­legal im­migration from Bangladesh, refu­tes this ar­gument by poin­ting to the birth rate among Kerala Muslims, who have a high level of education and a relativ­ely high stan­dard of living. Mani Shankar Aiyar had clai­med on the basis of statewise figures for the south­ern states that "Muslim birth rates in all these en­light­ened states are very much lower than Hindu birth rates in unen­lightened states like Uttar Prad­esh". However, Rai's clos­­er­­ analy­s­is of the figur­­­­­­­­­­­­­­es­ shows that the Kerala Mus­lims have a higher birth-rate than the natio­nal Hindu average and even than the Hindu average in poor and back­ward states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan: the population growth (+28.74% for 1981-91) in the Muslim-majority district of Malappuram (with female liter­acy at 75.22%, far higher than among Hindus in the Hindi belt) is more than twice as high as the aver­age for Kerala (+13.98), and well above the Hindu national aver­age (+23.50).
  • A secularist journalist confirms: "In spite of this 'near total literac­y' the popula­tion growth rate of Muslims who constitute one-fourth of Kerala's population is as high as 2.3 per cent per year, which is more than even the natio­nal PGR [= population growth rate] of 2.11 per annum and is almost double the PGR of Hindus in Kerala it­se­lf."
  • The figures for Kerala exemplify a general rule: at any given level of literacy and economic status, Muslims will have a marked­ly higher birth rate than their Hindu counterparts, even to the extent of having a higher birth rate than Hindus in a lower educa­tional or income brack­et. A secularist journalist, Pranay Gupta, estimates that in Hyderabad, which has a large Muslim middle-class, a typical Muslim family has eight child­ren while a Hindu family has four.
  • Pakis­tan is Asia's­ fastest­-growing non-Arab count­­­ry,­ doubling its popu­lat­ion every 24 yea­rs.
  • Leave alone Urdu pamphlets, a neatly published English book from the impec­cably Islamic Noor Publishing House (Delhi), Muham­mad Samiul­lah's Mus­lims in Alien Socie­ty, is suf­ficiently explicit about the demog­ra­phic desig­ns of contemporary Is­l­am. Samiul­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­lah rejec­ts family­­ plan­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­ning as a W­est­­­­­­­ern ploy to diminis­­h the num­bers of the Muslim population in order to maintain its hegemo­ny. The core of his argument is that birth control has no sanct­ion from the Quran nor from the example and sayings of the Proph­et. Since others have claim­e­d just the op­posite, a close reading of the source texts of Islam is needed.
  • As Samiullah notes, Moham­med sanct­ioned, even com­manded, the practice of coitus inter­ruptus, the then most read­ily availa­ble method of birth control, in the after­math of the battle of Badr, his first great victory which yiel­ded him a number of woman hostages. For the present dis­cus­sion, the point which Samiul­­­­­­­­­­­­­lah wants to make is that this guidel­ine laid down by the Prophet was contrad­icted by the Prophet himself on later oc­casi­ons. Samiul­lah reco­unts a number of Ahadis (episodes of the Prop­het's life ser­ving as the authoritative basis of Is­lamic law) where the Prop­het opposed this method of birth control.
  • Thus, after the cam­paign against the Banu al-Mus­taliq, the Mus­lims wanted to rape the hostages and asked Moham­med whether they should practise azl, but the Prop­het replied, with reference to the futility of human scheming before God's omni­potence: "It does not matter if you don't do it, for every soul that is to be born up to the Day of Resurrec­tion will be born." Since this (and similar ones) is a later Hadis than the one containing his pro-azl in­junction at Badr, it over­rules the ear­lier one, at least accor­ding to the theologi­cal principle that in case of contradiction, the earlier pronoun­cement is overruled by the later one.
  • That this natalist position has struck roots among ordinary Muslims may be illustrated with the case of Moham­med Tofazzal Mollah: he was sacked as Imam at the village mosque of Bahipara (northern Bangladesh) because his wife had been sterilized after having given birth to six childr­en. The village population ral­lied behind the two Maulanas who had issued the fatwa condemning the poor Imam. See: "Imam faces fatwa as wife refuses to con­ceive", Indian Express, 18-11-1993.
  • Demography is a bigger concern today because Islam is fighting for its survi­val, if not for world supremacy. Muhammad Samiullah is explicit about the good reason for natalism: "There is no denying the fact that the politi­cal prest­ige and military strength of a country depends upon the size of its popul­ation. (...) In the Islamic context greater populat­ion has a double sig­nifica­nce because one cannot wage an effective Jihad without an expanding popula­tion."
  • And why stop our conclusion with finding the Hindu position right? The data just surveyed also teach us something about the secularists who have ridiculed and thoroughly blackened the said Hindu position: they are wrong. We have not used any esoteric figures inaccessible to the common man; all these data were at the disposal of the secularists. Yet, some of them insist that the Muslim percentage will remain constant, or that the Muslim incre­ase is proportionate to relative Muslim poverty. The fact deserves to be noted: a whole class of leading intellec­tuals brutal­ly denies easily verifiable facts, i.c. the accelerating increase of the Muslim and the decrease of the Hindu per­centage, and the inten­tionality behind this Muslim demographic offensive.
  • One of the most painful aspects of Muslim demographic warfare is the open attempt by Muslims to grab non-Muslim girls to use them for their own demographic ambitions, meanwhile also inflicting a good dose of humiliation on the accursed kafirs. In Bangladesh and in Muslim-major­ity areas inside India, this often takes the form of simply kidnapping girls, or of threatening their families to marry them out to Muslims. In the open market-place of the West and of westernized circles in India, it takes the form of normal courtship, with the limitation that in case of a Muslim girl befriending a non-Muslim, family pressure is used on her, or physical threats on him or on both, to stop the affair; since the same is much less likely to happen in the reverse case, the net result is a considerable traffic of non-Muslim girls into Muslim households.
  • In NRI papers, you can occasionally read the testimony annex war­ning of Hindu women who sorely regret their mistake of having married a Muslim. E.g. one Hindu woman from the West Midlands (UK) warns Hindus to be alert when "some undesirables (...) who cannot tolerate a Muslim girl marrying a Hindu boy even in a movie, let alone in real life (...) try to take advantage of the innocence of Hindu girls to trap them in mar­riages." When a Hindu girl is approached by a Muslim, "she should be immediately alerted that he is actually fulfilling the Islamic command of grabbing and converting non-believer women by all possible means. It is not a reflection of my personal bitterness, I remind you of fatwas issued by Mullahs in England for Muslim boys in colleges and univer­sities to marry Chris­tian, Hindu and Sikh girls". Pratibha Bhambri: "Hindu Girls, Don't Get Trapped!", India Post, 26/7/1996. The line about Muslims not tolerating a Muslim girl marrying a Hindu boy even in a movie refers to Mani Ratnam's movie Bombay, a target of Muslim protests for showing just such an affair.
  • In late 1995, "the Chalvey Muslim boys" in the Chalvey area of Slough (between London and Oxford), circulated a "notice" in and around the Slough & Eton Secondary School, informing the public that: "We Muslims don't want Kafirs such as Sikh and Hindu children to mix with our children, specially our girls. Two years ago a Sikh boy was friendly with a Muslim girl and we made his life so difficult that he committed suicide. If your children come to this school, we will bully your boys the way we did to the boy who committed suicide, and we will make your daughter pregnant and change them into Islam. We mean what we are saying, and if you ignore it you will be very sorry."
  • A Sikh youth writes to the editor, lamenting yet another case of a girl trapped in a Muslim marriage and about to be taken to Pakistan: "It seems to be fashionable amongst some misguided members of our com­munity to think that the Muslims aren't really out to convert and brain­wash young Sikh and Hindu schoolgirls. They think that all these Sikh-Muslim fights are about young hotheads and extremists just out to cause trouble.(...) What I want to know is what these people are going to do about this schoolgirl. Is their idle chit-chat about Asian unity going to return her to her family? (...) Brothers and sisters, don't take anybody's word for it but see for yourself what the Muslims are doing to us.(...) Just talk to the schoolboys who have been bullied and terrorised for years by Muslim gangs. Just talk to schoolgirls whom the Muslims have threatened with rape. Just talk to the parents of Sikh and Hindu girls who have run off and converted.(...) These problems are real and becom­ing worse.(...) time is not on our side and the number of Sikh and Hindu schoolgirls who are running away and converting is increasing each day."